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Abstract 
The popularity of Foucauldian understandings of government in International Relations 
(IR) has led to a vibrant debate over the utility of Foucault’s work for the discipline, 
especially over its applicability outside Western liberal societies. By concentrating on 
governmentality’s international applicability, however, IR scholarship has neglected 
Foucault’s account of the foundations of modern social mentalities, apparatuses, and 
techniques. Foucault frequently based his ideas on historical research, with warfare and 
military affairs featuring prominently in his accounts of discipline and governmentality. 
Based on a problematization of the military aspects of Foucault’s thought, this article 
challenges Foucauldian IR scholarship to revisit governmentality’s foundations and re-
consider the contemporary relevance of Foucault’s account of government. Foucault 
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neglected the heterogeneity of European militaries, such as their reliance on 
impermanent, auxiliary, and non-Western forces. He thereby missed the opportunity to 
develop a more sophisticated account of the relationship between force, the military, 
government, discipline, and biopolitics. Moreover, this article challenges Foucauldian IR 
scholarship to revisit the empirical foundations of Foucault's work and re-consider the 
geographical and temporal extent of the relevance of Foucault’s account of government 
as a result.    
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Introduction 
Despite much recent International Relations (IR) scholarship drawing on Michel 
Foucault’s insights on governmentality and biopolitics, there has been relatively little 
engagement with the empirical foundations of Foucault’s work. In particular, Foucault 
spends some time exploring armies, war, and the ‘military apparatus’ (or dispositif) 
within his accounts of discipline and government.1 Despite this, there is very little 
scrutiny of this aspect of his work in IR literature. When Foucault’s military apparatus is 
discussed, it is often either taken for granted as part of the infrastructure of sovereignty 
and biopower which facilitates the ‘War on Terror’ and associated notions of the ‘camp’ 
or is viewed purely as an instrument of interventionism in neoliberal global politics.2 Yet 
Foucault identifies the apparatus as one of the foundations upon which government is 
                                                     
1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin, 1991a); Michel 
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège De France 1977–78 (New York: Picador, 
2007); Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège De France 1978–79 (New York: 
Picador, 2008). 
2 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998); Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, ‘Global liberal governance: Biopolitics, security and war’, 
Millennium, 30:1 (2001), pp. 41-66; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to 
Make Life Live (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); Jenny Edkins, Veronique Pin-Fat, and Michael Shapiro (eds),  
Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2004); Elizabeth Dauphinee and Cristina 
Masters (eds), Living, Dying, Surviving: the Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2007); Angharad Closs Stephens and Nick Vaughan-Williams (eds), Terrorism and the Politics of 
Response (London: Routledge, 2008); Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘The generalised bio-political border? Re-
conceptualising the limits of sovereign power’, Review of International Studies, 35:4 (2009), pp. 729-49. 
A notable exception (discussed below) is Christophe Wasinski, ‘On making war possible: Soldiers, 
strategy, and military grand narrative’, Security Dialogue, 42:1 (2011), pp. 57-76. 
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constructed and, despite the subsequent emergence of other knowledges, techniques, 
and methods, he explicitly states at the end of his Security, Territory, Population lectures 
that ‘governmentality’ remains dependent upon the foundation provided by a 
permanent military apparatus.3 
The military apparatus is, moreover, not simply significant in and as of itself. The soldier, 
a key figure within the apparatus, is highlighted in Foucault’s work due to its peculiar 
disciplined subjectivity. The soldier’s subjectivation is explored in relation to the 
emergence of disciplinary power; his/her body being the object of particular methods 
and techniques aimed at transforming an individual from a member of the general 
population into a subject whose conduct is highly regulated and whose body is at the 
service of government.4 As one of the first subjects of discipline the soldier is key to the 
emergence of ‘biopower’, a power ‘that has taken control of both the body and life or 
that has, if you like, taken control of life in general – with the body as one pole and the 
population as the other’.5 Discipline is one of the three ‘powers’ of Foucault’s 
governmentality, alongside sovereignty and government. As sovereignty is heavily 
reliant on the military apparatus, the soldier thus occupies a peculiar subjective position 
                                                     
3 Foucault (2007), p. 354. 
4 Foucault (1991a). 
5 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the Collège De France 1975–76 (London: 
Penguin, 2003), p. 253. 
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at the two ‘poles’ of government through biopower; the individual subject and the 
population as a whole. 
Given IR’s historic concern with matters of war, the lack of scrutiny of Foucault’s account 
in IR is surprising. Indeed, one critical voice has noted that Foucault’s governmentality 
work tends instead to inspire scholarship that is significantly different to the ‘traditional 
concerns of international relations theory’.6 This may stem from the fact that Foucault’s 
own analysis of the military apparatus is relatively limited outside the lectures and the 
pages of Discipline and Punish, and even here it is fragmentary. His analysis concentrates 
on the establishment of the apparatus between the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, 
but not on its continued evolution since then. Nevertheless, a vibrant debate in IR over 
governmentality in international politics offers the potential to engage with 
governmentality’s empirical foundations, including its military ones. Roughly speaking, 
one side of this debate contests governmentality’s international applicability due to its 
European roots and its emphasis on power in domestic, rather than international, 
settings.7 Conversely, others argue that governmentality is applicable as a theoretical 
                                                     
6 Jan Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault: discourse, liberal governance, and the limits of Foucauldian IR’, 
International Relations, 21:3 (2007), pp. 324-45, p. 331. 
7 Selby (2007); Jonathan Joseph, ‘Governmentality of what? Populations, states and international 
organizations’, Global Society, 23:4 (2009), pp. 413–27; Jonathan Joseph, ‘The limits of governmentality: 
Social theory and the international’, European Journal of International Relations, 16:2 (2010), pp. 223–
246; David Chandler, ‘Critiquing liberal cosmopolitanism? The limits of the biopolitical approach’, 
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framework for understanding domestic and international affairs because of the 
interdependency of both spaces. Meanwhile, it is viewed as a viable method of 
governing due to the pervasive influence of neoliberal international organisations and 
norms in a global political economy.8 The crux of the IR debate therefore concerns 
governmentality’s utility in an ‘international’ context, thereby echoing broader debates 
about the spatial nature of the discipline found in the works of, for instance, Kenneth 
Waltz and RBJ Walker.9 However valid and necessary this governmentality debate is, it 
nevertheless fails to engage with the empirical elements that Foucault identifies as the 
infrastructure of power around which governmentality has come to operate. The result 
is a body of IR scholarship which is willing to accept governmentality’s premises as both 
a theoretical framework and as a method of government without questioning the 
empirical foundations upon which governmentality is based. 
                                                     
International Political Sociology 3 (2009), pp. 53–70; David Chandler, ‘Globalising Foucault: Turning 
critique into apologia — a response to Kiersey and Rosenow’, Global Society, 24:2 (2010), pp. 135-42. 
8 Wanda Vrasti, ‘Universal but not truly ‘global’: governmentality, economic liberalism, and the 
international’, Review of International Studies, 39:1 (2013), pp. 49–69; Carl Death, ‘Governmentality at 
the limits of the international: African politics and Foucauldian theory’, Review of International Studies, 
39:3 (2013), pp. 763-87. 
9 RBJ Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993); RBJ Walker, After the Globe, Before the World (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 
2010); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2001 [1954]). 
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This article is motivated by two factors. The first is a suggestion by one of the IR debate’s 
participants. Appreciating the need to examine the nature and underlying social 
relations of liberal societies more deeply to understand ‘what it is about them that 
makes governmentality possible’, Joseph has issued a ‘call for action’ to further explore 
governmentality’s material foundations.10 The second is Foucault’s own peculiar 
assertion in Security, Territory, Population that ‘the great diplomatic-military apparatus 
… has hardly changed since the eighteenth century’.11  Accordingly, this article 
scrutinises the military aspects of Foucault’s thoughts on discipline, government, and 
biopolitics. It calls into question (‘problematises’ in Foucauldian terms) Foucault’s 
portrayal of the soldier and the military in Discipline and Punish and the Security, 
Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics lectures (henceforward ‘Discipline’, 
‘Security’ and ‘Birth’, respectively), in which the concepts of governmentality and 
biopolitics were explored in detail. The article begins by considering the debate over 
governmentality’s utility to IR. The article then illustrates the significance of historical 
analysis in Foucault’s work, before outlining his accounts of, first, the soldier and, 
second, the broader military ‘apparatus’. Finally, the article problematizes these 
                                                     
10 Joseph (2010), pp. 240-1. 
11 Foucault (2007), p. 354. 
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accounts whilst suggesting the need to rethink these underlying military aspects of 
Foucault’s work and the implications of this rethinking.  
The internationalisation of governmentality in IR 
Governmentality literature in IR is largely silent on the military context of Foucault’s 
work on governmentality and biopower. Much of this scholarship explores the extent of 
governmentality’s applicability in the ‘international’, introducing the notion of ‘global 
governmentality’. For instance, Dean’s contention is that a ‘global governmentality’ has 
emerged, ‘propounded’ by international governmental agencies and operating ‘through 
both the existing arts of domestic government within nation-states and as an attempted 
extension and generalisation of them across the planet’.12 Even if states themselves 
have limited authority in the international, there is no escaping the importance of some 
form(s) of ‘governmental’ intervention by, for example, transnational supra-
governmental organisations. Others, meanwhile, draw attention to the expanding 
involvement of non-state agencies in the process of government, either ‘internationally’ 
or through the domestic privatisation of some of the state’s functions.13 Burchell, for 
                                                     
12 Mitchell Dean, ‘Nomos and the politics of world order’, in Wendy Larner and William Walters (eds), 
Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 40-58, p. 53. 
13 For example: Graham Burchell, ‘Liberal government and techniques of the self’, in Andrew Barry, 
Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (eds), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neoliberalism and 
Rationalities of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Dillon and Reid (2001); 
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instance, draws on Foucault to make the point that modern government favours the 
delegation of some of its responsibilities to non-state agencies of power.14 Such works 
provide valuable contributions to our understanding of contemporary government 
drawn directly from Foucault’s work. Indeed, as Joseph notes, this may be 
governmentality studies’ most helpful contribution to IR:  
Foucault’s argument seems particularly well suited for describing current thinking on 
rolling back direct state involvement in various social and economic matters, bringing the 
state into cooperation with a complex network of other social institutions and giving the 
state more of a managerial role as an overseer of certain social processes.15 
Foucauldian accounts of government, therefore, rest on the premise that the state and 
a network of governmental agencies cooperate to manage life, possibly on an 
international scale. 
Other works emphasise the significance of Foucault’s account of subjectivity under 
governmentality.16 Such studies perceive Foucault’s account of the evolution of 
                                                     
Nicholas J. Kiersey, ‘Neoliberal political economy and the subjectivity of crisis: Why governmentality is 
not hollow’, Global Society, 23:4 (2009), pp. 363–86; Death (2013); Vrasti (2013). 
14 Burchell (1996), p. 20. 
15 Joseph (2010), p. 228. 
16 Kiersey (2009); Jason Read, ‘A genealogy of homo-economicus: neoliberalism and the production of 
subjectivity’, Foucault Studies, 26 (2009), pp. 25-36; Doerthe Rosenow, ‘Decentring global power: The 
merits of a Foucauldian approach to International Relations’, Global Society, 23:4 (2009), pp. 497-517; 
Couze Venn, ‘Neoliberal political economy, biopolitics and colonialism’, Theory, Culture & Society, 26:6 
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governmentality as an account of a complex process of subjectivation of individuals 
which culminates in the ‘biopolitics’ of neoliberalism. The emergence of neoliberalism 
from eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism, is the subject of Birth, wherein 
Foucault introduces homo œconomicus as governmentality’s principal subject.17 This 
subject is defined as ‘someone who pursues his own interest, and whose interest is such 
that it converges with the interest of others’;18 a consuming subject who is central to 
market society;19 and a subject who must be encouraged and trained to compete in this 
market by government.20 In short, the neoliberal subject needs to remain free only to 
the extent that it is ‘aware of what it wants and unaware of what is being done to it’.21 
It is the spread of this neoliberalism and this form of subjectivity in the international that 
signifies the emergence of a global governmentality.22  
Yet Foucault also explores other forms of subjectivity, including, in relation to discipline 
and the body, the soldier. An emerging corpus of ‘critical military studies’ literature in 
sociology and IR including authors such as Basham, McSorley, and Higate, have each in 
                                                     
(2009), pp. 206-33; Jason R. Weidner, ‘Governmentality, capitalism, and subjectivity’, Global Society, 
23:4 (2009), pp. 387-411; Vrasti (2013). 
17 Foucault (2008), pp. 225-6. 
18 Foucault (2008), p. 270. 
19 Kiersey (2009), p. 380. 
20 Read (2009), pp. 27-8. 
21 Foucault (2007), p. 105. 
22 Vrasti (2013). 
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some way or other linked Foucauldian ideas of military discipline to wider recent 
geopolitical issues.23 The ‘embodied legacy of military training’,24 as Higate calls it, has 
significant implications for both the domestic and the international contexts in which 
military force (and therefore the subjectivised warriors under analysis) is deployed both 
from and within. For Higate, this is manifested in the different levels of aggression 
adopted by security and military contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, with different 
states’ military training practices continuing to influence the behaviour of ex-soldiers 
following their transition to contractors. Basham, meanwhile, finds that as Western 
military operations dragged on in Afghanistan and Iraq, a militarized form of discipline 
emerged in home populations as a means of providing and showing support to deployed 
military personnel and veterans.25 This body of work is particularly sensitive to material 
and performative aspects of the political, appreciating that matter is ‘generative and 
agentive not just in the sense of bringing new things into the world, but also in the sense 
                                                     
23 Victoria M. Basham, ‘Effecting discrimination: operational effectiveness and harassment in the British 
Armed Forces’, Armed Forces & Society, 35:4 (2009), pp. 728–44; 2013. Victoria M. Basham, War, 
Identity and the Liberal State: Everyday Experiences of the Geopolitical in the British Armed Forces 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Victoria M. Basham, ‘Raising an army: the geopolitics of militarizing the 
lives of working-class boys in an age of austerity’, International Political Sociology, 10:3 (2016), pp. 258-
74; Paul Higate, ‘The private military and security contractor as geocorporeal actor’, International 
Political Sociology, 6:4 (2012), pp. 355-72; Kevin McSorley, ‘Towards and embodied sociology of war’, 
The Sociological Review, 62:S2 (2014), pp. 107–28. 
24 Higate (2012), p. 369. 
25 Basham (2016), pp. 268-9. 
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of bringing forth new worlds’.26 Indeed, in their Foucault-inspired explorations of the 
body, disciplinary practices, performativity, and the everyday of war and militaries, 
Basham, Higate and McSorley are all crucial in underlining how the process of 
subjectivation of individual soldiers is directly associated with the forms of politics 
experienced in the international. 
The claims of the global governmentality work, meanwhile, have been challenged. In 
addition to expressing concern over Foucauldians’ reluctance to engage with ‘traditional 
concerns of international relations theory’,27 Selby believes that the use of Foucault in 
IR often lacks recognition of ‘the distinctive problems of “internationalising” a theorist 
whose focus was primarily on the “domestic” social arena’.28 Furthermore, despite the 
fallacies of some ‘orthodox’ views of the division between domestic and international, 
there nevertheless exists ‘an ontological specificity to the international’.29 This is based 
on a number of ‘elements’, two of which are of particular note. First, a distinctive arena 
of international politics is brought into existence by the ‘power effects’ of discourses of 
nation-state, sovereignty, and anarchy, alongside the processes of ‘capitalist 
                                                     
26 Claudia Aradau, ‘Security that matters: critical infrastructure and objects of protection’, Security 
Dialogue, 41:5 (2010), pp. 451-514, p. 498. See also Basham (2013), p. 11. 
27 Selby (2007), p. 331. 
28 Selby (2007), p. 325. 
29 Selby (2007), pp. 337-8. See also Joseph (2009), p. 414. 
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modernity’. Second, the emergence and the territorial specificity of state-held 
capabilities of government, surveillance, consent-creation and coercion has 
consolidated differences between inside and outside spaces.  
A further critique of Foucauldian governmentality approaches concerns an alleged 
failure by ‘global governmentality’ scholars to break from an essentialist methodological 
trap also occupied by more traditional liberal approaches. Both Chandler and Joseph 
warn against such an essentialisation of the international which they claim occurs in 
governmentality research.30 As Joseph puts it: ‘IR theories of governmentality tend to 
take for granted the spread of (neo)liberalism through international institutions’, 
thereby attributing all parts of the international with a liberal character.31 Similarly, he 
argues that governmentality simply does not apply either as theory or practice in 
societies that do not possess the social basis or the institutions necessary to develop a 
liberal programme.32 Chandler complains that the ‘shift to “global governmentality” [in 
IR scholarship] is only engaged with superficially’, leading to a neglect of Foucault’s 
methodological emphasis on the need to subjectively frame meanings.33 Thus Chandler 
invites us to eschew superficiality by engaging more comprehensively with the 
                                                     
30 Chandler (2010); Joseph (2010). 
31 Joseph (2010), p. 242. 
32 Joseph (2009), p. 203; Joseph (2010), p. 237-8. 
33 Chandler (2010), p. 136. 
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substantive elements of Foucault’s thesis. Joseph also calls for further engagement, 
albeit with the material foundations of governmentality. His concern is that:  
Despite Foucault’s own talk of the development of capitalism, the spread of political 
economy and a new concern for population and workforce, many of the followers of 
Foucault are not prepared to talk of such conditions of possibility, only of the practices 
of governance themselves.34 
To the above, this article adds a call for ‘followers of Foucault’ to problematize 
Foucault’s account of the historical origins of governmentality, and especially to the 
social structures of those Western societies from which governmentality is understood 
to have emerged.  
Foucault’s military and historical foundations 
There is a prominent military-historical element to Foucault’s accounts of discipline, 
government, and biopolitics. Discipline, a precursor work to the lectures on 
governmentality, explores the soldier’s subjectivation in relation to ‘docile bodies’ and 
the evolution of disciplinary techniques during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.35 Foucault views the military as what McSorley calls the ‘foundational 
                                                     
34 Joseph (2010), p. 241. 
35 Foucault (1991a), pp. 135-69. 
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laboratory of disciplinary power’.36 Another lecture series, Society Must Be Defended, 
makes the case for politics being the continuation of war by other means, an inversion 
of Clausewitz’s famous axiom.37 Moving away from this argument in the later Security 
and Birth lectures, Foucault outlines the military’s creation and significance as one of 
the foundations of modern government.38 He explains that: 
the pastoral, the new diplomatic-military technique, and finally, police, were the three 
major points of support on the basis of which that fundamental phenomenon in the 
history of the West, the governmentalization of the state, could be produced.39 
These three ‘points of support’ evolved to form part of what Foucault called the three 
‘powers’ of sovereignty, discipline, and government which, despite emerging at 
different moments in history, have come to work alongside each other in the process of 
government.40 These three ‘powers’ are the ‘apparatuses of security’ that allow 
governmentality to function, underpinning its processes of subjectivation, and thereby 
constitute its ‘essential technical instruments’.41 Birth highlights the tensions between 
the world of the market and that of government, to the extent that governmentality’s 
                                                     
36 McSorley (2014), p. 116. 
37 Foucault (2003). 
38 Foucault (2007), pp. 301-6; Foucault (2008), p. 6. 
39 Foucault (2007), p. 110. 
40 Foucault (2007), pp. 107-8. 
41 Foucault (2007), p. 108. 
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‘global character’ is at stake, and it is only resolved through the establishment of ‘civil 
society’ as a new ‘field of reference’ for sovereignty.42 Crucially, however, despite all the 
threats to and the potential ‘disqualification’ of the sovereign by the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the market discussed in Birth,43 Foucault’s conclusion is that sovereignty (and all it 
entails) persists, governing with and alongside economics, and with important 
proprietorial and productive roles to play within associated territories.44 For its part, the 
soldier is central to both the sovereign and disciplinary apparatuses, being both subject 
and object of power. 
Despite their somewhat fragmented nature, these various works and lectures are 
sufficient to produce in Dean’s mind ‘a number of … lucid and coherent’ contributions 
by Foucault on government.45 Moreover, the military apparatus is always part of this 
understanding of government and, indeed, the Security lectures close by reasserting the 
significance of the military-diplomatic apparatus (and discipline) in a new world of 
‘économiste’ government.46 Here, Foucault summarises the ‘new governmentality’ by 
noting that government must ‘manage populations’, ‘organise a legal system’, and, 
                                                     
42 Foucault (2008), p. 295. 
43 Foucault (2008), p. 283. 
44 Foucault (2008), p. 284-5. 
45 Mitchell Dean, Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology (London: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 176. 
46 Foucault (2007), p. 354. 
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crucially, ‘has to provide itself with an instrument of direct, but negative, intervention’. 
Whilst this instrument was initially ‘a police with a repressive function’, it is now 
reinforced by the diplomatic-military apparatus. One of the key conclusions of the 
lectures, therefore, is that modern government operates thanks to a combination of 
forces, including the military apparatus. Consequently, the Foucauldian understanding 
of government as articulated in the Security and Birth lectures should not be understood 
without appreciating the military apparatus at its heart. 
With this in mind, it is frustrating that Foucault’s account of the military apparatus is less 
exhaustive than his ‘lucid and coherent’ musings on government. He admitted that this 
was an aspect of society that he wanted to explore in more detail, yet without ever 
fulfilling his ambitions: 
One theme I would like to study in the next few years is that of the army as a matrix of 
organisations and knowledge; one would need to study the history of the fortress, the 
‘campaign’, the ‘movement’, the colony, the territory.47 
This might explain Foucault’s claim that the military apparatus ‘has hardly changed since 
the eighteenth century’.48 Thus a key social object such as the apparatus is portrayed as 
                                                     
47 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, ed. Colin Gordon (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1980), p. 77. 
48 Foucault (2007), p. 354. 
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having achieved a permanence of form, ignoring the likelihood that social objects rarely 
maintain their form for long. True to his word, and despite its ongoing significance as 
one of the ‘points of support’ for ‘the governmentalization of the state’, Foucault never 
scrutinises the military’s evolution beyond the eighteenth century. To paraphrase 
Hobson’s critique of the use of history in IR,49 whereas Foucault is more than willing to 
speak of governmentality as being embedded in and constituted by historical processes, 
including the emergence of the military apparatus and discipline, this apparatus has 
become an ‘immutable illusion’, eternalised and made resistant to wider sociological 
change. This may well have served the purpose of supporting his claim of the existence 
of governmentality. Yet the result is a theory of government contingent upon an ossified 
conceptualisation of a military apparatus that is, as time progresses, increasingly at odds 
with its material realities in the real-world.  
This is all the more surprising given the engagement with history more generally in 
Foucault’s work. History flows through his analyses, from Discipline’s broad engagement 
with a number of texts and schemas to the lectures’ historical sociology of 
                                                     
49 John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at stake in ‘bringing historical sociology back into international relations’? 
Transcending ‘chronofetishism’ and ‘tempocentrism’ in international relations’, in Stephen Hobden and 
John M. Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 3-41, p. 6. 
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government.50 He has been variously labelled ‘the historian in a pure state’,51 ‘the 
greatest modern philosophical historian’,52 and a philosopher who ‘revives’ history.53 In 
his own defence of (Nietzschean ‘effective’) history, Foucault contended that ‘history 
has a more important task than to be a handmaiden to philosophy … its task is to become 
a curative science’.54 To this end he proposes an ‘effective’ history to explore ‘events in 
terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations’.55 Without 
engaging in detail here with Foucault’s historical methods, it is nevertheless important 
to note the prominent historical approach taken in Discipline and the lectures on 
governmentality and biopolitics.  
Conversely, the IR debate on Foucauldian notions of government is generally devoid of 
historical analysis. Foucault’s genealogical approach which owes much to history, on the 
other hand, has featured in calls for a ‘new materialism’ in IR. Building on such works’ 
appreciation of the agency of objects and the inert,56 Coole’s call for a ‘capacious 
                                                     
50 For an argument proposing Foucault to be a historical sociologist, see Dean (1994). 
51 Paul Veyne, quoted in Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1987), p. 275. 
52 Oswyn Murray, ‘Introduction’, in Paul Veyne (ed), Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and Political 
Pluralism (London: Penguin, 1990), p. viii. 
53 Jacques Deluze¸ Foucault (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 49. 
54 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, in Paul Rabinow (ed), The Foucault Reader (London: 
Penguin, 1991b), pp. 76-100, p. 90. 
55 Foucault (1991b), p. 88. 
56 For example: Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010); Bruce Braun and Sarah Whatmore (eds), Political Matter: Technoscience, Democracy, and 
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historical materialism’ encourages us to re-evaluate apparently ‘congealed’ institutions 
and systemic logics.57 Institutions and systemic logics, no matter how settled they might 
first appear, ‘need always be reappraised within any particular context, along with their 
underlying ontological assumptions, lest they become reified or taken for granted’. 
Foucault’s uncritical assumption of the eighteenth century ossification of the military 
apparatus, suggest a need for a reappraisal of the military apparatus. Moreover, the lack 
of a historical engagement in the ‘global governmentality’ and critical military studies 
work reinforces that need. To do so, however, first requires an exploration of the 
military’s significance in Foucault’s work. 
The soldier subject 
An important aspect of much of Foucault’s work, including Discipline and the lectures, is 
the link between the subject, power, and government. In relation to governmentality, a 
plethora of subjective processes and resulting subjectivities are evident within the 
component elements of the apparatuses. For example, ‘sovereignty’ involves members 
of the armed forces, judiciary, and diplomatic services, whereas ‘discipline’ involves an 
                                                     
Public Life (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Diana Coole and Samantha Frost 
(eds), New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).  
57 Diana Coole, ‘Agentic capacities and capacious historical materialism: Thinking with new materialisms 
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array of subjectivising spaces such as schools, asylums, and military training 
establishments, each producing and dependent upon its own distinctive subjectivities. 
Subjects associated with these apparatuses are simultaneously foundational and 
exceptional: foundational as they are those subjects upon or around whom government 
or ways of thinking about government are established; exceptional as the distinctiveness 
of their ‘sovereign’ and ‘disciplinary’ subjectivities is necessary for the subjectivation of 
the general population. The school, for instance, involves the subjectivation of pupils by 
another, very specialised, subject in the form of the teacher. In turn, such ‘teacher-
subjects’ are themselves products of distinctive subjectivation process which establish 
them as subjectivising agents for pupils, a process with its own specialised techniques, 
practices, and ways of knowing that are exceptional from but central to the 
subjectivation of the broader population.  
Significantly, the soldier is the first subject noted in Foucault’s account of the emergence 
of discipline in society,58 establishing it as potentially the original biopolitical subject. 
Foucault describes the soldier as a member of a permanent armed force under the 
control of the government,59 and it is as part of his exploration of disciplinary power in 
Discipline that Foucault first pays detailed attention to the soldier. Whilst Discipline 
                                                     
58 Foucault (1991a), p. 135. 
59 Foucault (2007), pp. 300-6. 
22 
 
predates his turn to governmentality, there is a clear thread connecting it with the later 
governmentality work, stemming from the understanding of discipline as an art ‘of 
composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine’.60 The conducting of conduct 
by government is, therefore, clearly emerging as one of Foucault’s key conclusions on 
the role of government before the governmentality lectures themselves. The soldier is 
not the only subject under Foucault’s analytical gaze as he explores the development of 
other disciplinary spaces and practices, such as the class, factory, and the hospital 
alongside the military training and the barracks. Crucially, these spaces involve the 
application of disciplinary techniques to change the behaviour of subjects, be these 
patients, recruits, prisoners, or pupils.61 Barracks are thus one of the first spaces 
dedicated to the exercise of disciplinary regimes over the bodies of subjects, and from 
which the broader notion of biopolitics grows. 
The emergence of such institutions and practices mark a significant shift in government, 
away from a reliance on juridical power towards the ‘action of the norm’ and the 
distribution ‘of the living in the domain of value and utility’.62 Foucault argues that we 
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should seek to explain power by considering the ‘entry of forces’ in the subject,63 and 
the class, factory, hospital and barracks are the points of such entry. The government of 
groups of individuals, therefore, was made possible through a concentration on their 
micro (‘tactical’) behaviour. The alteration of specific movements, postures, and bodies 
expanded from being merely a means of turning the individuals into collective entities 
into a method of governing the masses. Foucault’s primary contention therefore is that 
the practices developed in these disciplinary spaces permeated into wider society to 
facilitate a government by aggregation: the transformation of individuals into groups, 
classes, regiments, and units that were easily governable.  
Foucault’s analysis of government and the growing importance of the micro level of 
subjectivity is centred on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The period involved 
a range of major wars between European powers, such as the Thirty Years War (1618-
48), the wars of Spanish (1701-14) and Austrian (1740-8) succession, the Seven Years 
War (1756-63), and the revolutionary wars in the US (1775-83), Haiti (1791-1804), and 
France (1789-98). Yet in keeping with his ‘effective’ historical approach, in Discipline 
Foucault concentrates on the micro-tactical rather than the strategic level, exploring the 
changes to the training of soldiers and on the realisation of what training might achieve 
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of the soldier. He identifies a transformative period bookended by the image of the 
soldier in two texts, Montgomery’s La Milice Française (1636) and the French Crown’s 
Ordinance of 1764.64 Foucault contrasts Montgomery’s belief that one needed to be 
born a soldier and in possession of particular physical attributes with the Ordinance’s 
understanding that a soldier was ‘something that can be made; out of formless clay’. By 
the Ordinance, the soldier was to be formed via training regimes designed to get ‘rid of 
the peasant’ and to give him the ‘air of a soldier’. The soldier was thus turned into an 
‘exceptional subject’: one that was to be extracted from the general population and 
subjectivised in a different, but very deliberate, manner.  
This new form of soldier subjectivity developed alongside a new intellectual interest in 
the conduct of war, some involving detailed discussion of the bodies of soldiers. This 
was accompanied by a ‘revolutionary growth in military literature’,65 with ideas from 
works on military training acquiring a broader societal impact.66 Foucault himself cites 
works by a number of well-known enlightenment military figures, including Maréchal de 
Saxe, Maurice of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, and, especially, Jacques-Antoine-
Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert’s Discourse Préliminaire: Essai Général de Tactique I. The 
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soldier demonstrated how a body became something ‘docile that may be subjected, 
used, transformed and improved’.67 Military training formed part of a ‘political anatomy’ 
which allowed both control over the bodies of others along with improved speed and 
efficiency. This political anatomy was a result of a ‘multiplicity of often minor processes, 
of different origin and scattered locations, which overlap, repeat or imitate one another 
… [to] produce the blueprint of a general method’.68 Schemas emerged for 
uninterrupted and constant coercion, with a spread of disciplinary techniques from 
monasteries, armies, and workshops to being ‘general’ formulas of domination in 
society. These disciplinary methods were distinctive to those found under slavery as 
they did not rely on violence but rather on subtler forms of discipline. An ‘art of the 
human body’ was born which led to a growth in the subject’s skills and the intensification 
its subjection, and the body becomes the object and target of power. This made the 
subject ‘more obedient as it becomes more useful’.69  
The soldier was required to endure transformative techniques and practices designed 
to alter the very physics of his subjectivity. Foucault cites ‘rifle drill’ from the 1766 
Ordinance to illustrate how training in firearm use had led the emergence of the ‘body-
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weapon, body-tool, body machine complex’.70 Drill in particular comes to occupy his 
thought, along with its transformative effects on the human body. Foucault envisages 
the army as a  
geometry of divisible segments whose basic unity was the mobile soldier with his rifle, 
and … below the soldier himself, the minimal gestures, the elementary stages of actions, 
the fragments of spaces occupied or traversed.  
Foucault frequently draws on Guibert’s work whilst exploring drill according to a strict 
timetable underpinned by the ‘negative’ principle of non-idleness.71 Discipline, Foucault 
writes, ‘arranges a positive economy … [of] ever–growing use of time’ and generating 
‘organic individuality’. A ‘technique of subjection’ was established to form a ‘natural 
body’ to supersede the ‘mechanical body’.72 This ‘natural body’ became the target for 
new mechanisms of power, was offered up to new forms of knowledge, a body 
manipulated by authority, and ‘a body of useful training and of rational mechanics’.73 
Such ideas were, Foucault argues, what underlay Prussian infantry training under 
Fredrick II (the ‘Great’) with its breakdown of time and movements and embodied in the 
Prussian regulations of 1743. Figures such as Fredrick were important as they bridged 
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the gap between society, philosophy, government, and the military by fusing interest in 
the automata with approaches to military training, with notable successes on the 
battlefield. In turn, it is this aspect of Foucault’s work on the body and on drill that has 
informed much of the critical military studies work in IR. However, it should also be 
noted that Foucault was not the first observer of European socio-political evolution to 
highlight the significance of the militaries of this period. For instance, the early 
professional military officer was, for Max Weber, the prototype of the modern civil 
servant.74 Consistent across Foucault, Weber and the critical military studies literature, 
is the societal significance of the micro-processes of soldier training, with the soldier 
thus evolving from being merely an exceptional subject to the population to being one 
of the foundational subjects of contemporary politics, both domestically and 
internationally.  
The soldier, raison d’État, and international ‘balance’ 
The soldier occupies a second significant role in Foucault’s work beyond its role as 
incubator of societal disciplinary techniques. In his Security and Birth lectures, Foucault 
explores the development of the state and raison d’État, the principle according to 
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which the state comes to be governed. The development of a permanent army (and 
diplomacy) is presented alongside ‘mercantilism’ and ‘police’ as one of ‘a number of 
precise ways of governing’ in which the ‘plurality of the state is embodied’.75 He 
contends that:  
To govern according to the principle of raison d’État is to arrange things so that the state 
becomes sturdy and permanent, so that it becomes wealthy, and so that it becomes 
strong in the face of everything that may destroy it.76  
This has evident implications for the international and, indeed, Foucault’s discussion of 
raison d’État is arguably his most explicit venture into IR scholarship.  
As in Discipline, significance is awarded to the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. 
Foucault argues that this era involved the relations between states undergoing ‘one of 
the most fundamental mutations both in the form of Western political life and the form 
of Western history’, from being rivalries between Princes to being relationships of 
competition between states.77 This ‘mutation’ has significant consequences for 
international relations as it instigates a period where states seek to assert themselves 
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in a space of increased, extended, and intensified economic exchange. They seek to 
assert themselves in a space of commercial competition and domination, in a space of 
monetary circulation, colonial conquest, and control of the seas, and all this gives each 
state’s self-assertion not just the form of each being its own end … but also this new form 
of competition. To use somewhat anachronistic words for this reality, a state can only 
assert itself in a space of political and economic competition, which is what gives 
meaning to the problem of the state’s expansion as the principle, the main theme of 
raison d’État.78 
This reading of the international highlights the growing significance of ‘force’ and the 
emergence of a ‘new theoretical strata’ in which politics becomes the employment and 
calculation of forces. This new ‘strata’ involved a number of significant consequences 
such as: a change from thinking of possible conflicts in terms of the Prince’s wealth to 
thinking of them in relation to state wealth, establishing the state’s wealth as ‘the very 
force of the kingdom’; moving from estimating a Prince’s power by his possessions to 
investigating the state’s intrinsic wealth, resources, commercial possibilities, balance of 
trade and so on; and a shift from a diplomacy based on princely alliances and obligations 
to kin and family to new alliances centred on state interests. For Foucault, this 
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represented the establishment of a new governmental rationality, and a key moment in 
the development of governmentality.79 
Three ‘instruments’ are seen to serve this rationality: war; diplomacy and the ‘law of 
nations’; and a permanent military apparatus.80 The soldier, evidently, is associated with 
the first and third instruments. Regarding war, this becomes an instrument of politics in 
its own right by losing its ‘continuity with law, justice and right’. War is important as it 
provides the means through which territorial expansion is possible but, on the 
international level, it also threatens the European balance and thus the rationality of 
international politics. Moreover, in a nod of recognition of more total incarnations of 
warfare, Foucault argues that war now involves the employment of all the state’s 
resources.81 A political-military complex has emerged that is ‘absolutely necessary to the 
constitution of this European balance as a mechanism of security’, yet war itself is but 
one of the functions of the political-military complex. The relations between war and 
peace, civil and military have, Foucault claims, been redeployed around this political-
military complex. 
                                                     
79 Foucault (2007), pp. 285-6. 
80 Foucault (2007), pp. 300-6. 
81 Foucault (2007), p. 306. 
31 
 
The permanent military apparatus, the third and final instrument, is very clearly 
associated with the soldier. Whilst Foucault does not add much in the lectures to the 
earlier analysis of soldier subjectivity found in Discipline, he does outline four key 
components of the military apparatus. These are: (i) the professionalization of the 
soldier and the establishment of a ‘military career’; (ii) a permanent armed structure 
that can ‘serve as the framework for exceptional wartime recruitment’; (iii) an 
infrastructure of back-up facilities and strongholds; and (iv) a form of knowledge, ‘a 
factual reflection on types of manoeuvre, schemas of defence and attack, in short an 
entire specific and autonomous reflection on military matters and possible wars’. This 
emphasis on permanence is striking, as is the reference to the logistical infrastructure 
to support such a degree of permanence. It is also clearly implied that the permanent 
military apparatus is a state military, with Foucault questioning whether maintaining 
international balance is possible if all states did not seek to maintain an apparatus of a 
similar ‘level’ to that of its main rival.82 
This has significant implications for the international, or at least the European 
international system. Foucault contends that: 
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 The existence of a permanent, costly, large, and scientific military apparatus within the 
system of peace itself has … been one of the indispensable instruments for the 
constitution of European balance.83 
Thus the existence of the military apparatus is important not just to government, the 
broader subject of his lectures, but also to the constitution of a distinctive European 
space of balance within the international. He notes that: 
… the constitution of a permanent military apparatus … is an essential component of 
politics governed by the calculation of balances and the maintenance of a force obtained 
through war, or through the possibility or threat of war. In short, it is an essential element 
in this competition between states in which … each seeks to turn the relation of force in 
its favour, but which all seek to maintain as a whole.84 
The implications of raison d’État for the European states was that ‘each state [had to] 
limit its objectives [and] ensure its independence’.85 Indeed,  
From the Treaty of Westphalia to the Seven Years War, or to the revolutionary wars … 
military-diplomatic policy is organised by reference to the principle of the state’s self-
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limitation, to the principle of the necessary and sufficient competition between different 
states.86  
Thus was created, through raison d’État, a ‘zero sum’ problem of competition wherein 
each state risked losing everything in its attempts to become more powerful.87 However, 
a new eighteenth century liberal raison d’État emerged in response to the ‘zero sum’ 
problem. This allowed states to go to work on the subjects they governed, allowing 
government to expand indefinitely within their borders and leading to the establishment 
of ‘police’. The police state aims ‘to strengthen itself endlessly … its aim is an unlimited 
increase in its power in relation to others’.88 Making the subject more productive 
therefore became the means for states to strengthen themselves in relation to others. 
Thus, as outlined in the introduction to Birth, it is precisely because of the emergence of 
balance as the stabilising force within Europe, following the emergence of the military 
apparatus and sovereign raison d’État, that the liberalisms and their associated 
subjectivities discussed in Birth emerge.89 
To summarise this and the previous section, the significance of the soldier-subject in 
Foucault’s work is twofold. First, Discipline identifies the soldier as an exceptional 
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subject who is extracted from the general population and subjected to disciplinary 
regimes within dedicated spaces. Those regimes spread from their original contexts to 
enable the government of the wider population. Second, According to Security, the 
entire system is the ‘triangle’ of powers, including the sovereign and disciplinary powers 
to which the soldier is so important, underpins the whole system of governmentality.90 
In Birth, European liberalism is permitted to develop because of the international 
balance within Europe; the structural conditions of ‘zero sum’ international relations of 
the sovereignty raison d’État period encouraged a ‘mechanism of mutual enrichment’ 
through which ‘either the whole of Europe will be rich, or the whole of Europe will be 
poor’.91 
Problematizing Foucault’s military apparatus 
Foucault abandoned his exploration of the military when he shifted his focus to the 
eighteenth century transition from sovereignty-based raison d’État to a liberal 
‘governmental reason’.92 This, along with his claim that the military apparatus has not 
evolved in two centuries, is perplexing given both his stated desire to further explore 
the military and his recognition that discipline and the apparatus were so important to 
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his discussion of the centuries before the emergence of liberalism. As noted in the first 
section, the spatiality of governmentality has been a point of contention amongst IR 
scholars. There are clear ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ spaces in his work within which different 
conditions apply. This inside/outside dichotomy is not limited to the West/non-West 
divide but is also present where the state intersects the domestic and international. For 
example, raison d’État is understood to have ‘unlimited objectives’ within the state and 
only ‘limited’ objectives outside it.93 Nevertheless, Foucault’s work on the military also 
suggests a high degree of contingency between the international and the domestic. By 
considering Foucault’s discussion of the soldier in Discipline alongside his analysis of the 
military apparatus in the lectures, the international significance of micro-politics and 
subjectivity is revealed. Discipline produces soldiers who inhabit the apparatus which, 
in turn, establishes the conditions of international competition and European balance. 
This links the international to the individual, strengthening the case for 
‘internationalising’ a theorist whose primary focus, according to Selby, was on the 
‘domestic’. It is this micro-politics that is of interest to the critical military studies work 
of Basham, McSorley, and Higate, and it is reinforced by Wasinski. Also drawing on 
Foucault, Wasinski argues that the practices of military discipline, geometric planning, 
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and panopticism discussed in Discipline are part of a ‘military grand narrative’ that has, 
since the Middle Ages, made war possible in the international.94 The micro of military 
discipline is always part of a broader, interconnected whole via the nature of the 
institutions (militaries) produced by the disciplinary regime. Analysis of the soldier thus 
echoes claims that power cannot be localised at the micro-, meso-, or macro-level 
because these spaces are not ‘in and of [themselves] necessarily real’.95 
The timeframe of Foucault’s work is also noteworthy, with the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries crucial for the development of both discipline and the military 
apparatus. This era also saw momentous developments in warfare and is the subject of 
a debate in historical scholarship over a suggested ‘military revolution’ which 
transformed warfare and socio-political structures in Europe and beyond.96 Foucault’s 
identification of the 130 years between Montgomery’s La Milice Française (1636) and 
the French Crown’s Ordinance of 1764 as the key transformative period in military 
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training notably contrasts with the ‘military revolution’ debate’s longer period of 
change, beginning with medieval advances in infantry warfare and ending in the various 
revolutionary wars with the advent of bayonets and dispersed formations of light 
infantry.97 Whilst not necessarily undermining Foucault’s overall conclusions, this 
earlier, medieval dating of the beginnings of drill in Europe calls into question the 
broader philosophical context in which he claims that such reforms occurred. Foucault 
associated the shifts in military discipline with works such as Montesquieu’s De l’Espirit 
des Lois (1748), La Mettrie’s L’homme Machine (1747) and Holbach’s Système de la 
nature (1770) to argue that new ways of knowing and thinking about the body had 
emerged which facilitated a new way of governing. La Mettrie’s work, for instance, 
fostered an ‘obsession’ with the body and a shift from an understanding of the body as 
a totality to exploring individual movements and attitudes.98  
The military revolution scholarship, on the other hand, finds more material reasons for 
the introduction of drill, including the introduction of firearms and increased 
appreciation of the potency of polearms against armoured cavalry. The re-emergence 
of the pike-phalanx (Bean, 1973: 206) in the fourteenth century posed an existential 
challenge to a political system organised around the mounted knight’s military 
                                                     
97 On the medieval origins, see Rogers (1995, 2010). On the eighteenth century, see Black (1991). 
98 Foucault (1991a), pp. 136-7. 
38 
 
superiority over the population.99 The phalanx was a close-order infantry formation of 
ranks armed with ‘the simplest weapon with which a man on foot can be armed against 
cavalry’,100 the spear. Phalanxes proved invulnerable to attacks by knights on numerous 
occasions, such as at the battles of Courtrai (1302), Bannockburn (1314), Morgarten 
(1315), Dupplin Moor (1332), Halidon Hill (1333), Laupen (1339), and Crécy (1346). Yet 
the success of the phalanx was due to ideational factors rather than any new material 
enhancement to the ancient pointed stick. Early firearms similarly required the 
development of training and drill for effective use. As Bean observes, infantry armed 
with bow, pike, crossbow, or handgun were ‘practically helpless in small parties’ but 
‘useful when en masse and trained to act en masse’.101 What changes in the fourteenth 
century, therefore, is the ability of rulers to train soldiers to operate en masse, turning 
a levy of individual peasants into formidable blocks of mutually reinforcing ranks of 
pikemen and, later, musketeers.  
Foucault also ignores some important features of warfare during this period and since. 
Notably, his understanding of soldiering is state-centric, with no consideration of other 
forms of combatants beyond the state-trained soldier. The account of training in 
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Discipline, for instance, concentrates on the barracks, ignoring other possible spaces of 
military discipline. This is perhaps unsurprising given that Foucault was writing in the 
1970s when conscription was widespread and the world wars were recent history. 
Conscription magnifies the subjectivising impact of military discipline as large 
proportions of populations pass through their doors to be given the ‘air’ of soldiers. 
Meanwhile, the world and ‘cold’ wars were possibly what Foucault had in mind when 
suggesting that conflicts now involved all ‘the state’s forces’ in efforts to achieve 
victory.102 Both conscription and ‘total’ wars make very visible within society the 
permanent armed forces, the infrastructure of back-up facilities, and the military 
knowledge which Foucault cites in his lectures.103  
Yet nuclear weapons have rendered industrial warfare almost obsolescent, at least 
between nuclear armed states, as a nuclear war would likely be over before many of the 
‘forces of the state’ could be brought to bear. As the early American nuclear strategist 
Bernard Brodie wrote: ‘nuclear weapons do by their very existence in large numbers 
make obsolete the use of and hence need for conventional forces on anything like the 
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scale of either world war.’104 Meanwhile, the actual experience of conflict for most 
Western societies since 1945 has usually been in ‘wars amongst the people’ outside 
Europe, requiring only a small portion of the state’s forces in predominantly counter-
insurgency and police-type actions.105 Such wars present the observer with a myriad of 
possible soldier types distinctive to Foucault’s barrack-trained state soldier. Within IR 
scholarship a source of much curiosity has been the proliferation of private military 
actors, often alongside state forces.106 The expansion in the use of private military 
companies (PMCs) has been rapid: whereas the US in the late 1990s employed one 
contractor to every fifty members of its armed forces it deployed in Yugoslavia, by Iraq 
in 2008 the ratio was one to one.107 The US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 
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2000s accelerated the PMC resurgence, to the extent that the market may have been 
far smaller in size without the interventions.108  
Whereas the private force literature addresses many of the challenges posed by PMCs 
to international politics, Foucault’s neglect of this aspect of the security apparatus is lost 
on the global governmentality debate. This neglect is intriguing as many of the military 
thinkers Foucault cites were keen users of private forces. Foreign mercenaries were 
common in the armies of the Dutch Republic (Maurice), Sweden (Gustav Adolphus), 
France (Guibert; the Ordnances), and Prussia (Frederick). These were often soldiers who 
may not have been subject to the disciplinary regimes and spaces identified in his 
work.109 For instance, Frederick needed between one- to two-thirds of the positions in 
his eighteenth century Prussian army to be filled by foreign mercenaries.110  
This picture is further complicated by the practice of sourcing soldiers from groups that 
were outside the territory and disciplinary influences of the state, such as highlanders, 
hussars, uhlans, and jäegers.111 The recruitment of such soldiers was driven by a need 
for warriors who were effective in the rougher terrain where European armies were 
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increasingly fighting during the eighteenth century and, crucially, where ‘standard’ 
European military practice was found wanting. As Ferris argues, European armies ‘were 
designed for high-intensity combat or sieges and operations in territories with open 
terrain, large populations, and well-developed logistical infrastructure’.112 Using such 
militaries outside Europe was problematic ‘because of differences in terrain, politics, 
enemies, and infrastructure. To work elsewhere, the systems had to be adapted to local 
conditions’. It was recognised that the standardised model of army training was 
unsuitable for many contexts in which European armies found themselves operating, 
and overseas campaigns would demand the participation of frequently large numbers 
of foreign auxiliaries.113 Such auxiliaries were recruited precisely because they were 
different to the European armies of the Enlightenment and had not been subjected to 
the forms of training outlined in Foucault’s work. 
Interestingly, Foucault may well have been aware of some of these points in his research 
on discipline and the formation of the military apparatus. Guibert’s Essai Général de 
Tactique, which is a source for Discipline, includes three particular observations 
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overlooked by Foucault. First, Guibert was critical of Adolphus and Maurice’s 
resurrection of Roman tactics and drill, claiming instead that it was the Roman spirt that 
needed to be emulated. Second, and linked to the above, this spirit should include duty 
and patriotism, thereby linking military service to notions of professionalism and the 
nation. Whilst this is not wholly at odds with Foucault’s state-centric idea of the military, 
it does introduce the question of soldier motivation, with Guibert recognising that 
correct motivation was far more important than correct drill. Third, in place of the 
rigidity of massed drilled formations, Guibert argued for imaginative and innovative 
soldiers open to a variety of tactical approaches.114 However, it is not clear why Foucault, 
despite citing Guibert’s descriptions of drill and body movements,115 did not delve 
further into the latter’s ideas.  
Indeed, European armies sometimes displayed considerable initiative on colonial 
campaigns to ‘become the enemy to defeat it’, thereby radically altering their doctrine 
and fighting methods.116 For example, before 1914 ‘most British forces were designed 
for use in only one arena’,117 thus limiting their global utility whilst maximising it in 
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particular localities. After 1918, however, the British army recognised that it may be 
involved in four different kinds of conflict, with each sort demanding ‘different kinds of 
organization, equipment, and training’.118 In 1965 recently retired US Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Ambassador in Saigon General Maxwell Taylor reversed his 
initial advocacy for US troop deployment in Vietnam by stating that a ‘white faced 
soldier armed, equipped and trained as he is [is] not [a] suitable guerrilla fighter for Asian 
forests and jungles’.119 Guibert himself noted that an army of citizens was ill-suited for 
operations beyond the homeland and, rather prophetically in relation to more recent 
conflicts, questioned the willingness of national soldiers to care as much for ‘all the 
provinces of the empire’ as they did for their homes and families.120  
Perhaps reflecting the limitations of the ‘traditional’ Western way of war outside the 
West, the US has often developed unique force structures according to circumstances, 
creating in Barkawi’s words ‘a mostly foreign and private force for one purpose (CIA 
covert operations), a foreign and public one for another (colonial armies, foreign 
legions), and a domestic and private one for another (US private contractors in Iraq)’.121 
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Central to US foreign policy since the 1950s has been President Eisenhower’s idea ‘to 
develop within the various areas and regions of the free world indigenous forces for the 
maintenance of order, the safeguarding of frontiers, and the provision of ground 
capability’.122 Crucially, Eisenhower continued, ‘the United States could not maintain 
old-fashioned forces all around the world’ and that having other nationalities bearing 
the brunt of any fighting ‘was the kernel of the whole thing’. Eisenhower thus identified 
the problem for any military seeking to operate in the international: material conditions 
such as lack of resources and unfamiliarity with local geography demand the 
employment of foreign forces to augment the military apparatus of even the most 
powerful of governments. 
Eisenhower’s words along with Barkawi’s observations conjure the spectre of not a 
single permanent military apparatus in the Foucauldian mould but rather a 
heterogeneous apparatus, a multi-headed hydra driven by a frequently opaque 
combination of public and private motivational logics, especially outside Europe. Indeed, 
Western ‘colonial conquests’, a central element of international competition in 
Foucault’s Security lectures,123 usually relied upon native, irregular, and private 
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auxiliaries operating alongside Western regulars.124 Examples such as the 1916-18 Allied 
pursuit of the forces of General von Lettow-Vorbeck in east Africa and contemporaneous 
Anglo-French operations against the Ottoman Empire in the Levant demonstrate that 
even intra-European wars involved significant numbers of native, impermanent, or 
auxiliary soldiers within nominally Western armies.125  
Whilst not necessarily negating Foucault’s findings on the spread of discipline 
throughout society, this heterogeneity exposes the limits of military discipline. Discipline 
is, Foucault writes, ‘the unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a “political” 
force at the least cost and maximized as a useful force’.126 Yet the conflicts above suggest 
that the disciplined soldier of Foucault’s account was less useful in unfamiliar contexts, 
and that meeting military objectives often depends on combining disciplined subjects 
with other, differently- or un-disciplined subjects. The key to military success in the 
international, therefore, rests not on discipline per se, but rather the ability to persuade 
the un- or differently-disciplined to cooperate with the disciplined within military 
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campaigns. This opens the door to new lines of enquiry regarding the power relationship 
between the different elements involved in a campaign, including exploring the use of 
different soldier types.  
Such analysis might include the matter of subject motivation, along with its relationship 
to disciplinary techniques. Mercenaries, for instance, can bring with them problems of 
their own. Machiavelli’s famous critique was that mercenaries were insufficiently 
bloodthirsty, could not be trusted due to the temptations of political power, and that 
their motivations were inappropriate for those wishing to engage in warfare.127 Whilst 
he has been questioned by some,128 the issues Machiavelli raised have not 
disappeared.129 Pertinent in a Foucauldian context is the matter of Gustav Adolphus’ 
armies, again not discussed by Foucault himself. In this instance, the use of mercenaries 
had a negative effect on army discipline, which was itself based as much on a sense of 
religious morality as on Foucauldian drill-based discipline.130 Consequently the Swedish 
king sought to better integrate his mercenaries into his national army by dealing with 
them ‘not as hired units but as individual soldiers’. Indeed, ‘individualism was a 
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remarkably prominent ingredient in the Swedish Army … in counterpoise with the 
discipline that made his army a reincarnation of the legions’.131 The need to 
accommodate the often individualistic motivations of private soldiers thus led to new 
forms of disciplinary practices beyond simply drill, geometry, and sub-units.  
Similar problems emerge when the reverse occurs, that is when state-trained soldiers 
become commercial security and military contractors. Higate’s ethnographic research 
reveals that when military contractors are faced with danger, the lessons of weapon drill 
from their public soldiering days instinctively kick into action; in echoes of the 
Foucauldian automaton, contractors become ‘robotic’ in their physical responses to 
danger.132 Unlike state soldiers, however, contractor responsibilities and objectives are 
often very different, focusing mainly on convoy security, close protection of dignitaries, 
hostage negotiation, guarding of civilian and military installations, training of local 
personnel as part of security sector reform, provision of logistical and support functions 
to military peacekeeping. Only to a much lesser extent are contractors expected to 
engage in combat operations, the task for which their state-directed drill prepares 
them.133 Problems involving contractors instinctively becoming aggressive whilst on 
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deployment have, notes Higate, led some to call for more recruits from the civilian world 
for PMCs; individuals without the robotic muscle-memory typically instilled in military 
training barracks.  
Another aspect of the ‘motivational problem’, so to speak, can be seen in a further 
soldier type to have been disciplined within the European/Western training system, the 
foreign auxiliary. These might include anyone from a Natal native drilled for a few weeks 
by European instructors before joining the Natal Native Contingent in the 1879 Anglo-
Zulu War,134 to Army of the Republic of Vietnam soldiers trained by the Americans. The 
motivations for individual auxiliaries might differ, ranging from notions of duty to local 
chiefs ingrained in the indigenous south African amabutho system, to earing a decent 
wage. Yet their motivation would influence the ability of the major Western power to 
incorporate them and their leaders within their military apparatuses.  
In Vietnam, for instance, decades of US support, funding, and training, including 
President Nixon’s ‘Vietnamization’ programme, could not account for the agency of the 
South Vietnamese government. Despite US pressure and an even more extensive aid 
package, South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu refused to cooperate at the 
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1972 Paris Peace Talks, scuttling US plans for a prompt cessation of hostilities.135 
Similarly, recent US efforts to support specific tribes in Afghanistan, including subjecting 
large numbers of Afghans to Western training methods, have often resulted in 
strengthening local warlords who, in turn, have undermined other aspects of Western 
policy in the region.136 The Afghan and Vietnamese cases demonstrate one of the 
fundamental problems with a heterogeneous apparatus, namely the inability of the 
wielder of the apparatus to fully rely on its constituent parts. This echoes Machiavelli’s 
concerns about mercenaries, and, indeed, Machiavelli’s points were aimed just as much 
at auxiliaries as they were at mercenaries,137 branding them as both ‘useless’ and 
‘almost always harmful to those who use them’.138 
Problematising Foucault’s account of the soldier and the military apparatus therefore 
reveals a much more complex military apparatus than the one found in Foucault’s works 
themselves. Changes to training associated with drill and body movement were made 
necessary by material changes far earlier than Foucault suggests, around the early 
fourteenth century. The armies and soldiers of seventeenth and eighteenth century 
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Europe which featured so prominently in Foucault’s works armies were more diverse 
than Foucault suggest, often involving large numbers of impermanent mercenaries. 
Military heterogeneity is also more pronounced outside than inside Europe, and the role 
of private military actors was negligible for much of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, when major belligerents mostly conformed to international legal norms on 
the matter of private force.139 Recent wars involving Western soldiers appear to 
continue these trends, although the lack of wars within Europe/the West itself adds a 
speculative aspect to such a conclusion.  
Conclusion 
Whilst not necessarily rendering Foucault’s work redundant, the problematization of the 
military apparatus and the more complex picture this reveals raises questions over the 
broader empirical foundation of Foucault’s theories of government. For instance, why 
did Foucault not discuss the role of private force in government or the mixed forces of 
colonial empires? Why choose the examples that he did, and not others? More 
fundamentally, perhaps, to what extent does the state- and Euro-centric nature of his 
understanding of the military apparatus have a bearing on his overall conclusions about 
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the development of a new governmental rationality in the eighteenth century? For a 
‘philosophical historian’ who drew extensively on a historical method, and who argued 
that role of history was to become ‘"effective” to the degree that it introduces 
discontinuity into our very being’,140 such a problematization of Foucault’s own work 
might be entirely in keeping with his intentions. Indeed, his account of the military 
apparatus and military discipline can be viewed as being inconsistent with such an 
‘effective’ historical approach: Foucault eschewed his usual desire to explore ‘events in 
terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations’ to provide 
instead a more orthodox reading of European military history, based on a supposed 
consolidation of centralised, permanent, state militaries.  
The key finding of this problematization is that the militaries of the societies discussed 
in Foucault’s works were and are far more heterogeneous than suggested by Foucault 
himself. A permanent armed force of Foucault’s description may have been the 
necessary platform for the development of governmentality and a suitable international 
context based on balance or competition. Yet Foucault, the ‘philosopher historian’, 
based his theories on a patchy exploration of history, including some of the sources 
(such as Guibert) and cases (Frederick II) he identified as being central to the 
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development of government, discipline, and the international system. He thereby does 
not account for the significant role of private, foreign, and auxiliary forces in the military 
apparatus, nor for the likely earlier medieval dating of the military disciplinary processes 
identified in Discipline and Punish. Indeed, the ‘military revolution’ debate might prove 
to be fruitful reading for those seeking a fuller (if still somewhat Eurocentric) analysis of 
many of the historical aspects of Foucault’s accounts of government, the state, and 
discipline.  
Proponents of the notion of an emergent global governmentality, meanwhile, would do 
well to appreciate the very different nature of military apparatuses across the globe, 
both in the past and the present. The state-centricity of nineteenth and twentieth 
century warfare within Europe was rarely matched outside it, reinforcing critical voices 
within IR who question whether the necessary conditions are yet present outside 
Europe for Foucault’s ideas to be applicable. One means of making a case for a global 
governmentality would be to re-examine the conditions for a local governmentality, 
which is outlined so fluently in Security. If governmentality, as Foucault expressed during 
the lectures,141 does rest on the triangle of powers that includes discipline and (under 
sovereignty) the military apparatus, what are the implications for governmentality if 
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neither the discipline nor the military apparatus are what Foucault claimed they were? 
As this article demonstrates, if governmentality exists at all outside the West, it appears 
that it must rely on the support of a very different military (and more broadly, security) 
apparatus to that found within the West itself, one that demands further investigation. 
